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Abstract 
This paper examines contracting between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur in a setting with unobservable effort 
when contracts are renegotiated each period. The contribution of our paper lies in the insights it provides on optimal 
contracts in this setting. The insights from our model prove to be significantly different in certain respects than those 
obtained under a multi-period contract without renegotiation or a single period setting. An example is worked out to 
illustrate the division of payoff between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur each period.
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1. Introduction 
Venture  capital  firms  take  chances  on  financing  new  companies  that 
traditional sources of money wouldn't and shouldn't touch. In return for 
taking  that  extraordinary  risk,  the  theory  goes,  VCs  stand  to  gain 
extraordinary returns by owning shares of companies that increase in value 
much  faster  than  the  average  publicly  held  company.  [Stewart  Alsop 
Fortune, April 15, 2002, page76] 
Venture capital funding for startups, and in turn, research on it, has grown in importance in the 
last two decades.  The focus of this paper is the analysis of optimal contracts between the Venture 
Capitalist (VC), who provides funding, and the entrepreneur, who has the knowledge. The paper 
implements dynamic optimization techniques to analyze the nature of the relationship between 
the VC and entrepreneur in a startup company where the VC and the entrepreneur renegotiate the 
contract each period. As such, as far as we know, our setting is unique in the VC literature. We 
analyze the trajectory of optimal contracts over time and examine the entrepreneur’s trajectory of 
optimal effort over time.  
The contribution of this paper lies in the insights it provides on optimal contracts in this 
setting, which prove to be significantly different in certain respects than those obtained under a 
multi-period contract without renegotiation or a single period setting. Just how important is the 
issue of contracting between the VCs and entrepreneurs?  A recent article in Business Week, has 
described contracting between VCs and entrepreneurs:   
To  improve  their  chances  of  a  payoff,  they're  putting  the  screws  to 
entrepreneurs, their teams, and other VCs. Talks have become so long and tortuous 
that  the  legal  costs  for venture  financing  have  doubled. ``There  is  a  frenzy  of 
extraordinarily draconian terms going on right now,'' says Craig Johnson, a lawyer 
at Venture Law Group who represents startups. [Linda Himelstein, Business Week, 
May 27, 2002, Iss. 3784, page 82] 
Our analysis suggests that entrepreneurs who perceive the overall rewards for success to 
be high will work harder than in the case where rewards to success are low. It also implies that 
the VC should not reward failure at any stage and that the guiding principle should be “Pay For 
Performance”, which we detail. Another such result is that the payment to the entrepreneur should 
be reduced when the probability of success, relative to the effect on entrepreneurs’ effort of is 
high.   In addition, our study shows that the payoff to the VC from current period and future 
periods should be such that the rate of improvement in chances of success, resulting from added 
effort from the entrepreneur, should equal the rate of increase in the VC’s payoff.  
 
2. Background and Literature Review 
Entrepreneurs of firms typically come up with the idea and the product.  The financing 
raised from VCs is typically used for continuing the development of the product and marketing it 
effectively.  VCs have helped many well-known companies in their beginning. Examples of firms 
that VCs have financed in early stages include Microsoft, Intel, Lotus, Apple, Staples, TCBY, and 
Federal Express (for an excellent discussion on how the VC industry operates and its history 
please see Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2002)). VCs, such as Tommy 
Davis, Eugene Kleiner, Tom Perkins and Arthur Rock, have become legends in the high-tech 
industry for their part in the creation of the computer industry as we know it today.   2 
Why do VC firms exist? Can’t entrepreneurs just go and get a loan from the bank? Amit 
et. al [1998] argue that VCs exist because of their ability to reduce informational asymmetries.  
Specifically, banks and other institutional lenders, in contrast with VCs, are unable to distinguish 
between high and low quality entrepreneurs. As such, VCs are in essence financial intermediaries 
who thrive because of their superior ability to screen and monitor entrepreneurs. 
How do VCs make money? 
Venture  firms  make  money  in  two  ways.  They  get  a  share of  a 
fund's profits (the "carry"), and they also earn a percentage of the capital 
committed  in  management  fees,  regardless  of  whether  the  capital  is 
actually invested.  [The Economist , April13, 2002, pg. 75] 
Virtually all of the studies in the area view venture capital as a short-term source of funding.  VCs 
aim to exit the firm once it reaches sufficient size and credibility so it can be sold to the public 
through an IPO or to another company (see, for example MacIntosh [1997] Tables 12 and 13, and 
Amit et. al [1998] figure 5).  
Financing from VCs comes usually in several rounds.  Amit et. al [1997] discuss the 
various funding rounds that companies go through with VCs prior to the cash out stage (see figure 
3 in Amit et. al [1997]). Based on Gompers (1995) and Sahlman (1990) the various stages of VC 
investing can be characterized as follows: 
 
Figure 1 - Stages of Investment by Venture Capitalists 
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Note: Numbers between stages denote time in years. 
 
Several studies examine the asymmetric information aspects of the VC and entrepreneur 
relationship and their effect on the optimal form of financing (examples include Chan (1983), 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Barry (1994), Bergemann and Hege (1998), Trester (1998), Neher 
(1999), Elitzur and Gavious (2003b), and Wang and Zhou(2004)).  Some of these papers focus on 
the  mechanism  of  staged  financing  (e.g.,  Neher  (1999)).    Others  investigate  what  form  the 
financing instrument should take and ask, for instance, whether it should it be provided in the 
form of debt, equity, or a hybrid instrument (examples of such studies include Bergemann and 
Hege (1998) and Elitzur and Gavious (2003b)).   
Our  study  examines  repeated  contracts  between  the  VC  and  the  entrepreneur  of  the 
company where the effort of the entrepreneur is unobservable by the VC.  Furthermore, this study 
is, as far as we know, the first one to investigate the VC and entrepreneur relationship with 
repeated contracts that are renegotiated each period between the parties rather than a single long-  3 
term contract or a single period contract.
1 The contribution of our paper lies in the insights it 
provides on optimal contracts between the two players when such contracts are renegotiated at the 
beginning of each period. The multi-period model with renegotiated contracts is consistent with 
reality because, as the above stages described in Sahlman (1990) and Gompers (1995) show, the 
relationship between VCs and entrepreneurs develops over several stages and several years and 
that VCs do not commit themselves to a single multi-period contract.  
An aspect of the relationship between VCs and entrepreneurs that we do not investigate in 
this study is the adverse selection problem.  The problem that we examine here deals mainly with 
the moral hazard aspect of the relationship that, in essence, starts after the adverse selection 
problem has been resolved. Sahlman (1990) provides a description of the mechanism that VCs 
employ to deal with the adverse selection problem. Another aspect of the relationship we do not 
investigate here is the syndication of investments by several VCs (Lerner (1994) provides an 
insightful discussion of this topic).  We also do not investigate the role of ‘angel’ investors in 
financing of startups (Elitzur and Gavious (2003a) provide a formal analysis of this relationship). 
 
3. The Model 
Our setting involves a startup company with two risk neutral players: an entrepreneur and 
a VC.
2 It is assumed that the contract between the two players cannot be canceled in the middle of 
a period.  The game has up to K stages where K is common knowledge.  In every stage, k, of the 
game the entrepreneur chooses optimal effort level,  k e  > 0. The VC cannot observe or infer  k e  
but only whether the stage was a success or a failure.   k e , in turn, affects the probability of 
success in this stage, ) ( k k e α . The following assumptions are made with respect to k α : 
K k e e e k k k k k k ,..., 1     , 0 ) ( "      , 0 ) ( '     , 0 ) ( 1 = < > ≥ ≥ α α α   
The above assumptions state that the probability of success (1) is between 0 and 1, (2) 
increases in effort, and (3) has diminishing marginal returns to effort. 
Interest is held at zero to increase the mathematical tractability.  The assumption of zero 
interest  is  made  because  incorporating  a  positive  interest  rate  would  make  the  model  more 
cumbersome and, as we found out, does not really add any insights as we have here a finite 
horizon game.   
If the outcome of stage k is a success the payoff of the VC changes by  k B  and both 
players continue to the next period.   k B  is, in essence, the expected change in the value of the 
VC’s  holdings  in  the  firm.  The  VC  cannot  infer  the  entrepreneur’s  effort,  k e ,  since  it  is 
unobservable by him and he cannot infer the effort from the fact that the firm fail or succeed in 
the k
th stage.  k B  can assume in our model any value and, thus, will be negative or positive. In 
each  stage  the  VC  invests  0 ≥ k I ,  k I   is  common  knowledge  constant.    The  entrepreneur  is 
awardedSk ≥ 0.    Another  way  to  look  at  this  is  that  until  period  K  the  award  to  the 
                                                 
1 One could argue that the approach to use to describe this relationship is incomplete contracts (for an excellent 
discussion of the topic please see Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hart (1995) and Maskin (2002)) where the concept of 
renegotiated contracts is also used. One of the prerequisites of incomplete contracts is to have a parameter which is 
observable but non-verifiable.  In the case of VCs and entrepreneurs, however, the parameter (entrepreneur’s effort) 
is unobservable and thus the approach of incomplete contracts is ruled out in our case.  
2 The assumption of risk neutrality is quite common for papers on this topic (see, for example, Trester (1998) and 
Wang and Zhou (2004)).    4 
entrepreneur,Sk , and the residual claim of the VC,  k S   -   Bk , reflect the share in  the company that 
the entrepreneur and the VC respectively get each period. Note that  Sk  is generic and, thus, we 
do not impose any structure on this sharing rule on purpose because we do not want to limit the 
contract to any specific form of financing instrument.
3  Furthermore, we are not focusing in this 
paper on the financing instrument that should be used as there are other studies who deal with this 
question (see, for example, Bergemann and Hege (1998) and Elitzur and Gavious (2003b)).   
If, on the other hand, the outcome is a failure the company earns 0, the entrepreneur‘s 
reward is  Fk ≥ 0 and the game terminates.
4 We assume that the VC demands that his overall 
payoff,  1 k k V   B + + ,  should exceed the payment to the entrepreneur,  k S , otherwise the VC will 
have  no  incentive  to  remain  in  this  firm.  k B   is  assumed  to  be  common  knowledge.    If  the 
outcome in each stage is a success for the company the game ends at stage K with a cash-out to 
the VC who exits the firm.
5  The entrepreneur incurs a cost of effort  ) ( k e C  > 0 at each stage 
k=1,..,K.
6  It is assumed that  0 ) ( ' > k e C and  ) ( " k e C > 0. We assume that both functions  (.) k α  for 
k=1,...,K,  and C(.) are common knowledge.
7 The time line each period is depicted in the Figure 
2: 
The expected payoff to the VC in each stage k, Vk , follows the recursive equation below:
8 
[ ] [ ] k k k k k k k k k k I F e V S B e V − − − + − = + ) ( 1 ) ( 1 α α    k =1,...,K    (1) 
The expected payoff to the entrepreneur in each stage k, Uk, follows the recursive equation 
below:
9 
[ ] [ ] ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( 1 k k k k k k k k k e C F e U S e U − − + + = + α α   k =1,...,K   (2) 
Define VK+ = 1 0and UK+ = 1 0. 
We use backward induction to look for the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium in this model. 
 
                                                 
3 As opposed to this study, in most finance models, the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power (captures all 
surplus), not the VC. 
4 From our assumptions it follows that the entrepreneur cannot be dismissed until the end of the period and only if it 
is a failure. 
5 For characterization of this exit point see Elitzur and Gavious (2003b). 
6 Alternatively, we could redefine the notations in the model as follows: 
K 1,2,..., k     ,   )) ( ( ) ( ~      K, 1,2,..., k      ,   ) (
1 = = = =
−
k k k k k k c C c e C c α α  
where 
1 − C    is the inverse function of C.  This would streamline the results but, unfortunately, some of the model’s 
results would seem to be less intuitive. 
7 Note that we assume that the functions of α and C are known but not their realized values because they depend on 
the entrepreneur’s effort, which cannot be observed by the VC. 
8 Vk is a function of Sk  and  Fk .  Thus, for the sake of simplicity, we omit these variables and write Vk  instead of 
V S F k k k ( , ). 
9  [ ] [ ] ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( 1 k k k k k k k k k e C F e U S e U − − + + = + α α U k  is a function of  k e , thus, for the sake of 
simplicity, we omit this variable and write Uk  instead of U e k k ( ).   5 
FIGURE 2  - THE TIME LINE EACH PERIOD 
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In  this  section  we  analyze  the  model  and  obtain  results.    We  start  by examining  the 
optimal effort of the entrepreneur over time.  Then we analyze the characteristics of the trajectory 
of the optimal compensation scheme over time.  Next, the optimal payment to the entrepreneur 
for failure is obtained.  The last part of the section defines the optimal payment,  k S , over time. 
The following Proposition examines the optimal effort of the entrepreneur over time: 
Proposition 1: The optimal effort of the entrepreneur in each period,  ek
*, k=1, ..., K,  has the 
following structure: 
K   1,..., = k     ), ( 1
* *
+ + − = k k k k k U F S e e      (3) 
Proof:  Relegated to Appendix 1 
In essence, Proposition 1 states that 
*
k e  is a function of the difference between the benefit 
from success, 1 + + k k U S , and the reward for failure, k F . The Proposition is intuitively appealing 
because it shows that the entrepreneur is going to exert effort depending on the rewards for either 
success or failure and the future prospects.  Consequently, entrepreneurs who perceive the overall 
rewards for success to be high will work harder than in the case where rewards to success are low.  
As such, one should expect entrepreneur to exert high levels of effort where the capital market is 
bullish on their industry, say, like during the Internet bubble. Furthermore, this may explain the 
fact that VCs invest in industries that are in high growth and not very competitive where rewards 
to success are substantial.  
One myth is that venture capitalists invest in good people and good ideas.  
The reality is that they invest in good industries- - that is, industries that are more 
competitively forgiving than the market as a whole. [Zider, 1998, page 133]. 
Proposition 1 may shed some light on why VCs moved from the energy industry in the early 
eighties to genetic engineering, specialty retailing and computer hardware, then to CD-ROMS, 
multimedia, telecommunications, and software, then they flocked to invest in Internet companies 
and, now they are moving to Biotech companies.  The pattern that Zider [1998] describes is that 
industries that VCs invest are ‘sexy’ at the time of investment.  ‘Sexy’ industries are those that   6 
provide substantial rewards to the entrepreneur for success, and, in turn, elicit a high effort level 
from the entrepreneur.   
The VC chooses the optimal trajectory of compensation to the entrepreneur (in essence, 
the share of the company awarded to the entrepreneur), taking into account, the self-interested 
choice  of  effort  by  the  entrepreneur.    This  scheme  will  be  set  according  to  the  following 
Proposition:  
Proposition 2: The optimal trajectory of compensation to the entrepreneur over time satisfies the 
following condition: 
[ [ [ [ ] ] ] ] α α α α' ( ) '( ) k k k k k k e S F U C e − − − − + + + + = = = = + + + +1           (4) 
Proof:  Relegated to Appendix 1 
Proposition (2) implies that the optimal compensation awarded each period by the VC to 
the  entrepreneur,  anticipating  effort  selection  by  the  entrepreneur,  is  at  the  point  where  the 
marginal expected benefit from effort to the entrepreneur,  [ ] α' ( ) k k k k k e S F U − + +1  is equal to the 
entrepreneur’s  marginal  cost  of  effort,  C ek '( ).  The  following  Proposition  characterizes  the 
payment to the entrepreneur for failure: 
Proposition 3:  Not rewarding the entrepreneur for failure at each stage is an optimal strategy 
for the VC. 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
The  intuition  behind  this  Proposition  is  straightforward,  a  payment  for  failure  for 
entrepreneurs is inconsistent with a ‘pay for performance’ compensation strategy because such a 
payment creates an incentive for the entrepreneur to exert little effort or none, as effort is costly 
for the entrepreneur but not rewarded.
10 Proposition 3 is consistent with, and complementary to, 
the work of Bergemann and Hege (1998) and Elitzur and Gavious (2003b) who argue that the 
optimal share contract should reward the entrepreneur only if he was successful.  
Proposition 3 implies that we can ignoreFk  and write the revised program as follows: 
[ ] k k k k k k k I V S B e V − + − = +1 ) ( α    k =1,...,K      (1’) 
[ ] ) ( ) ( 1 k k k k k k e C U S e U − + = + α   k =1,...,K      (2’) 





X B S V k k k = − + +1.  The  following  Proposition  characterizes  the  optimal  payment  to  the 
entrepreneur, k S , over time: 
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Proof:  See Appendix 1 
                                                 
10 While the Proposition may seem straightforward ex-post it still needs to be proved in order to show payment under 
all possibilities.   7 
Condition (5) in Proposition 4 states that the optimal payment to the entrepreneur,Sk , is 







, less the entrepreneur’s expected future payoffs, Uk+1. 
Condition (6) in Proposition 4 tells us that the entrepreneur is never paid the entire payoff 
of the VC, V B k k + + 1 , because it follows from (6) that  Sk  <  V B k k + + 1 .   Further, condition (6) 
states  that  the  optimal  payment  to  the  entrepreneur,Sk ,  increases  in  the  rewards  to  success, 
V B k k + + 1 . Another insight provided by equation (6) is that, ceteris paribus, the payment to the 









 is high, i.e., when the probability of success, 
αk k e ( *), relative to the effect on entrepreneurs’ effort of  Sk ,  αk k k e e '( *) *', is high.  In other 
words, payment to the entrepreneur will be high as long as he provides some added value in terms 
of his effort.  
When we rearrange and combine conditions (5) and (6) the following obtains, 
















+          (7) 
Condition (7) implies that if the probability of success,  *) ( k k e α , is large relative to the 
effect on entrepreneurs’ cost of effort,  *' *) ( ' k k e e C , then the sharing rule would favor the VC and 
vice versa. Proposition 4 is different from the results in Elitzur and Gavious (2003b) where the 
optimal  incentive  scheme  backloads  all  incentive  payments  to  the  entrepreneur  as  much  as 
possible and thus the VC takes the entire payoff from the firm until a certain threshold point from 
which  the  entrepreneur  takes  it  all.  Consequently,  Elitzur  and  Gavious  (2003b)  argue  that  a 
straight debt contract is optimal in their setting.  The underlying cause for the different result 
between this study and Elitzur and Gavious (2003b) is the use of renegotiated contracts in this 
study rather than a single long-term multi-period contract (which Elitzur and Gavious (2003b) 
use).  We argue that contracts are often renegotiated and, consequently, we need to understand the 
implication of renegotiation. Proposition 4 leads to the following sharing rule between the two 
players: 
Proposition  5:  The  payoff  to  the  VC  from  current  period  and  future  periods  satisfies  the 
following condition: 




















        (8) 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
Condition (8) states that the payoff to the VC from current period and future periods 
should be such that the rate of improvement in chances of success resulting from added effort 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper examines the relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur in a 
multi-period setting when contracts are renegotiated each period. As far as we know this is the 
first paper in the VC literature that uses renegotiated contracts in its setting than a single long-
term  contract or  a  single  period  setting.  The  contribution  of  our paper lies in the insights it 
provides on optimal contracts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. These insights prove 
to be significantly different in certain respects than those obtained under a multi-period contract 
without renegotiation or a single period setting.  
An interesting aspect of the relationship between VC s and entrepreneurs that we do not 
investigate  here  is  the  adverse  selection  problem.    The  problem  that  we  examine  here  deals 
mainly with the moral hazard aspect of the relationship that, in essence, starts after the adverse 
selection problem has been resolved.  A possible direction to extend this study is how should VCs 
select entrepreneurs in a manner that alleviates the adverse selection problem. 
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APPENDIX 1 - MATHEMATICAL ADDENDUM 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 




e S U e F C e
k
k
k k k k k k k k = + − − = + α α '( ) '( ) '( ) 1 0    (A.1) 
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= 0).  Also, define 
[ ] X S U F k k k = + − +1 .  Consequently, (A.1) implies: 
′ = ′ α k k k e X C e ( *) ( )
*           (A.2) 
(A.2), thus, implies the following function 
e e X k k * *( ) =                (A.3) 
     ￿ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 
Rearranging (A.1) yields the result.    ￿ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 
To get the optimal payment the VC solves the following problem: 
[ ] [ ] k k k k k k k k k k
F
I F e V S B e V Max
k
− − − + − = + ) ( 1 ) ( 1 α α   k =1,...,K   (A.4) 
s.t.  k k k S V B ≥ + +1   10 
Given the following problem for the entrepreneur: 
[ ] [ ] Max U e S U e F C e
e k k k k k k k k k
k
  = + + − − + α α ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1  k =1,...,K     (A.5) 
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     (A.8) 
[ ] B S V k k k − + +1  should be positive otherwise the VC pays the entrepreneur more than his payoff.  
Since by the assumption αk k e '( *)  is positive.  As in (A.7), ek*' is negative.   Consequently, (A.8) 
is negative.   
(A.8) implies that the payment for failure actually reduces the optimal effort of the entrepreneur 
and, hence, lowers the payoff of the VC.  Accordingly, the best payment from the VC’s view is 
the lowest possible one, which is zero.  Further, Vk from (A.1) is monotonically increasing in  k e  
and monotonically decreasing in Sk .  ￿ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 
In light of Proposition 1, in order to get the optimal payment, the VC solves the following 
problem: 
[ ] MaxV e B S V
A
k k k k k k
k
f = − + + α ( ) 1   k =1,...,K                      (A.9) 
Given the following problem for the entrepreneur: 
[ ] Max U e S U C e
e k k k k k k
k
  = + − + α ( ) ( ) 1  k =1,...,K    (A.10) 
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k = − +
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 where  X B S V k k k = − + +1. The VC’s first-order condition with respect to 
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k
k













                     (A.14) 
 ￿ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5 
Rearranging Equation (6) yields 










= − + +         (A.15) 




 where  X B S V k k k = − + +1 and rearranging provides the 
following condition: 




















        (A.16) 
￿  